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Abstract 
 
Brigadier-General Wilfrid Malleson (1866–1946) received his commission into the Royal 
Artillery in 1886 and transferred to the Indian Army in 1904. He was relatively 
inexperienced in combat having served on the staff of Field Marshal Kitchener as part of 
the British military mission in Afghanistan. Malleson was later transferred to East Africa 
where the 2nd South African Division fell under his overall command during the 
catastrophic attack on Salaita Hill. This was the first occasion, since the formation of the 
Union Defence Force (UDF) in 1912, where a British officer commanded South African 
troops in battle – with disastrous consequences. There were deep underlying reasons 
behind the fledgling UDF’s first defeat at the hands of the veteran Germans, commanded 
by the wily Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck (1870–1964). Malleson’s lack of combat 
experience was a factor in the defeat, but more importantly, the uninspired plan of attack 
doomed the UDF to failure.  
 
Keywords: Jan Smuts; South Africa; Von Lettow-Vorbeck; German East Africa; military 
doctrine; Union Defence Force; Salaita Hill; manoeuvre warfare.  
 
Opsomming 
 
Brigadier-Generaal Wilfrid Malleson (1966–1946) het in 1886 sy kommissie ontvang in 
die Koninklike Artillerie, waarna hy in 1904 na die Indiese Leër toe verplaas is. Ten spyte 
daarvan dat hy deel was van veldmaarskalk Kitchener se staf tydens die Britse militêre 
missie in Afghanistan, was sy gevegservaring relatief beperk. Malleson is later verplaas na 
Oos-Afrika waar hy in bevel was van die Suid-Afrikaanse 2de Divisie tydens die 
katastrofiese aanval op Salaita-heuwel. Dit was die eerste geval, sedert die stigting van die 
Unieverdedigingsmag (UVM) in 1912, dat ŉ Britse offisier in bevel was van Suid-
Afrikaanse troepe tydens ŉ geveg – met rampspoedige gevolge. Daar was diep 
                                                          
*  Major (David) D.B. Katz is a PhD (Mil) candidate in the Department of Military Science, 
Stellenbosch University. He is working on “General J.C. Smuts and his First World War”. His 
email address is dkatz@icon.co.za. My thanks to Evert Kleynhans and Will Gordon for 
assisting me in formulating the Afrikaans abstract. 
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onderliggende redes vir die UVM se eerste nederlaag teen ervare Duitse troepe onder die 
bevel van die uitgeslape kolonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck (1870–1964). Hoewel Malleson 
se gebrek aan gevegservaring ŉ rol gespeel het in die nederlaag, was dit grotendeels die 
ongeïnspireerde plan vir die aanval wat gelei het tot die UVM se mislukking.  
Sleutelwoorde: Jan Smuts; Suid-Afrika; Von Lettow-Vorbeck; Duits Oos-Afrika; militêre 
doctrine; Unieverdedigingsmag; Salaita-heuwel; maneuvreerende oorlogsvoering. 
 
Background 
 
The Union Defence Force (UDF) was unlike that of the other belligerents fighting it out in 
the world’s first global conflict. South Africa’s otherness came about from the fact that the 
UDF was comprised of former enemies. A mere 12 years before the First World War, 
Englishman and Boer were bitter foes, locked in mortal combat. The UDF’s establishment 
in 1912 was two years after the declaration of the Union of South Africa in 1910. It was a 
miraculous exercise in conciliation. The formation of the Union of South Africa was an 
effort to consolidate and merge the disparate aims of the various nationalities living within 
its borders with those of the British Empire.1 The hope was that Afrikaner nationalists, 
seeking varying degrees of self-determination, would combine with English-speakers, 
those who owed their allegiance to the British Empire, to form a political entity out of a 
mere geographical expression. 
 
 An overriding political motive gave impetus to the formation of the UDF in 1912. It 
was an exercise in nation building more than the creation of a force designed to secure its 
borders from enemy invaders. Political compromise underpinned its structures and the 
authorities made appointments with more of an eye to soothing historical animosities 
than on skill and expertise. The UDF’s military doctrine incorporated that of the Boer 
forces, the former colonial armies and the British Army. The military perceived the 
immediate threat as internal strife emanating from disaffected and disenfranchised blacks. 
The military planners composed the thought, doctrine and structure of the fledgling UDF 
around the unlikelihood of a foreign invasion by a European power.2 
 
                                                          
1. The South Africa Act of 1909 states this quite blandly in its preamble: “Whereas it is 
desirable for the welfare and future progress of South Africa that the several British 
colonies herein should be united under one government in a legislative union under the 
crown of Great Britain and Ireland.” 
2.  Ian van der Waag has produced a unique body of work dealing with the formation of the 
UDF. See I. van der Waag, "Smuts’s Generals: Towards a First Portrait of the South African 
High Command, 1912-1948", War in History, 18,1(2011);  I. van der Waag, "South African 
Defence in the Age of Total War, 1900–1940", Historia, 60,1(2015);  I. van der Waag, "Boer 
Generalship and the Politics of Command’, War in History, 12,1(2005). Another work that 
has merit on the formation of the UDF is T.J. Stapleton, A Military History of South Africa 
from the Dutch-Khoi Wars to the End of Apartheid (Praeger, Santa Barbara, 2010). 
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 Indeed, the UDF’s first actions in the short two years between its formation and the 
advent of the First World War were against its citizenry. Authorities made use of imperial 
troops to contain a general strike in July 1913. Jan Christiaan Smuts (1870–1950), minister 
of Interior, Defence and Mines, was loathe to use imperial troops and deployed the UDF to 
crush a more serious strike in January 1914.3 The UDF’s first noteworthy military test 
occurred shortly after South Africa entered the First World War and it was once again 
against her citizens. The campaign against their next-door neighbours in German South 
West Africa (GSWA) would have to wait. The UDF occupied itself in quashing 11 000 
Afrikaner rebels, led by former members of the UDF, between August and December 1914. 
The fact that the UDF was able to complete this major internecine operation successfully 
was proof of the measures which Smuts and Louis Botha (1862–1919), the prime minister, 
introduced to the fledgling and politically sensitive UDF.4 
 
 After the UDF successfully suppressed the rebellion, it was time to deal with the 
Germans ensconced across the border in GSWA. That the South African forces numbered 
approximately 50 000 compared to the modest German force numbering about 7 000, did 
not tempt them to conduct a costly war of annihilation.  They avoided pitched battles in 
favour of advancing on multiple fronts. By using the threat of envelopment, the UDF 
dislodged the Germans from their prepared positions and made them defend locations not 
of their primary choice.  The South Africans forced the Germans to surrender on 9 July 
1915 with their fighting capability almost intact. The successful conclusion of the 
campaign, at relatively low human cost, was vindication of manoeuvre warfare and carried 
all the hallmarks of a South African “way of war”.5 
 
 The battle for Salaita Hill took place at the beginning of 1916. It was the first 
occasion that South African troops, under British command, engaged with the Germans in 
German East Africa (GEA). Here conditions and the enemy were unlike anything that the 
South Africans encountered before. When one assesses the battle of Salaita Hill, one has to 
keep in mind the very real political sensitivities behind every battle decision. No army in 
the world is devoid of political sensitivity, in fact, one could say that they are the product 
of the political collective. The UDF was a reflection of the society that formed it. However, 
the fact that South Africa was not a homogenous society and that its army consisted of 
former adversaries thrown together, influenced its performance on the battlefield in a 
unique way. 
 
 South Africa also suffered from an inferiority complex; she sought status within the 
Empire and the successful waging of warfare would not only bring prestige but also 
                                                          
3.  I. van der Waag, A Military History of Modern South Africa (Jonathan Ball, Cape Town, 2015), 
pp 83, 84. 
4.  Stapleton, A Military History of South Africa, pp 113–118. 
5.  A. Garcia, "Manoeuvre Warfare in the South African Campaign in German South West Africa 
during the First World War", MA dissertation, University of South Africa, 2015. Garcia 
presents an insightful study on the GSWA campaign. 
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provide nation building. South Africa harboured sub-imperialistic ambitions leading to 
deep-seated expansionist desires in Africa. Therefore, in conducting a war in Africa, on 
behalf of the British Empire, South Africa sought to acquire certain territorial assets at a 
minimum cost in human lives thus gaining prestige within the Empire and forging a 
national identity for its divided nation.6 All these influences formed a complex political 
web, which shaped South African military doctrine. 
  
Salaita Hill was South Africa’s first battle in GEA and reveals the UDF’s cohesion, 
doctrine, training, political outlook, weaknesses, and strengths built during its peacetime 
training process. Salaita Hill was a test of all the UDF’s preparations and doctrines. Only 
once an army has engaged in a number of battles and conducted warfare for a lengthy 
period, do other factors come into play, which forge the efficacy of its fighting power 
beyond its initial training.7 This article revisits the battle of Salaita Hill, making use of 
primary and secondary sources to trace the doctrinal development of the UDF and explore 
the differences between the British and South African way of war. Malleson and Salaita are 
the lens through which the clash of military doctrine is revealed.   
 
The clash of battlefield doctrine 
 
Military doctrine is a set of fundamental military principles designed to gain advantage 
and eventually overcome an enemy. It is a formal expression of military knowledge and 
thought to guide military forces on how they should conduct their operational art and 
tactics to achieve their strategic objectives. It is descriptive rather than prescriptive, 
outlining how the army thinks about fighting, but not how to fight. It is a guide to military 
activity and does not replace initiative and judgement on the battlefield.8 The doctrinal 
lens needs continual adjustment to stay in focus with the introduction of improved and 
new technologies into warfare, thereby throwing the relationship between the different 
arms (artillery, air, armour, and infantry) out of synchrony.9 
 
                                                          
6.  South African expansionism is a subject that historians have yet to explore fully. Hyam and 
Katzenellenbogen have done sterling work in broaching the subject. See R. Hyam, and P. 
Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa since the Boer War 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003); R. Hyam, The Failure of South African 
Expansion, 1908–1948 (Macmillan, London, 1972); R. Hyam, Understanding the British 
Empire (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010); and S. Katzenellenbogen, South 
Africa and Southern Mozambique: Labour, Railways, and Trade in the Making of a 
Relationship (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1982). 
7.  J. Shy, “First Battles in Retrospect”, in C.E Hellere and W.A Stofft (eds), America's First 
Battles, 1776–1965 (University Press of Kansas, Kansas City, 1986). 
8.  (Author’s emphasis) This definition owes its derivation in part to the Canada Department 
of National Defence, “The Conduct of Land Operations”, B-GL-300-001/FP-000, 1998. 
9.  J. Baily, The First World War and the Birth of the Modern Style of Warfare (Strategic and 
Combat Studies Institute, Camberley, 1996), p 48. 
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 At the outbreak of the First World War, the British system of warfare had not 
advanced much from the Anglo-Boer War and this was particularly true in Africa. At the 
outset of the Anglo-Boer War, the British made use of what Thomas Pakenham labels, “the 
Aldershot set-piece in three acts”. This one-day action comprised the first act – an artillery 
duel, and a preparation of the ground. The second act consisted of the infantry launching 
a frontal assault in open order formation, and then ultimately charging the enemy position 
with fixed bayonets once they were close enough. The final act was a cavalry charge to cut 
off the enemy’s retreat.10  This anachronistic form of warfare cost the British dearly in the 
Anglo-Boer War. The set piece action was, of course, devoid of operational art and lacked 
combined arms warfare with minimal cooperation between the three different arms 
(infantry-artillery- cavalry). 
 
 However, British military doctrine did not completely stand still and evolved to a 
certain extent because of the lessons learnt in the Boer War. Costly battlefield experiences 
resulted in the publication of the Infantry Training Manual of 1902.11 The manual 
supported offensive action over defensive action but categorically rejected simple brute 
force and the use of frontal attacks across open, fire-swept ground.12  The manual correctly 
suggested that turning movements would yield better results for far fewer casualties on a 
modern battlefield where defensive firepower could overwhelm even large numerical 
advantages. It identified the need for combined arms warfare and close cooperation 
between arms but offered minimal suggestions on a systematic method of 
implementation.13 The Russo-Japanese War 1905 served as a catalyst in revitalising the 
frontal assault for influential British military thinkers who emphasised willpower over 
firepower. The Field Service Regulations 190914 published after the Infantry Training 
Manual 1902, began to reflect these subtle changes. It de-emphasised flank attacks and 
gave preference to the “final assault” over developing superior firepower. The belief that 
courage alone could overcome defensive firepower began to take hold. The newfound 
preference for bold offensive action steadily eroded the cautious approach that emerged 
directly after the Boer War. The result was a downgrade in the belief of firepower and 
movement, replacing it with faith in moral supremacy and willpower.15 Military theorists 
                                                          
10.  T. Pakenham, The Boer War (Futura, London, 1982), p 128. Meinertzhagen admits that he 
has no understanding of manoeuvre warfare, which is not surprising, in the light of the 
British predisposition for the Aldershot way of war. 
11.  Infantry Training (Provisional) (War Office, London, 1902). 
12.  Infantry Training (Provisional), p 146. See also S. Jones, "The Influence of the Boer War 
(1899–1902) on the Tactical Development of the Regular British Army, 1902–1914", PhD 
thesis, University of Wolverhampton, 2009, p 51. 
13.  Jones, ‘The Influence of the Boer War, p 43. 
14.  Army Council, Field Service Regulations: Operations (His Majesty’s Stationery Office,  
London, 1909). 
15.  Combined Training  (War Office, London, 1905), pp 100, 101). See also Jones, ‘The Influence 
of the Boer War, pp 65, 66. [Colonel] Beca, A Study of the Development of Infantry Tactics 
(George Allen & Unwin, London, 1915), discusses the overturning of the defensive 
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saw the Boer War as an aberration from the conditions of a European war in which the 
lessons learnt were not totally transferable or applicable to European conditions.16 
 
 The Germans, on the other hand, were much more flexible in their approach to 
warfare. German military culture prized initiative down to the lowest levels of command. 
Their mission-type tactics (Auftragstaktik) was a central component of the German Armed 
Forces since the nineteenth century. This military culture allowed subordinates to make 
decisions on the spot down to the lowest levels of command, on condition that they 
complied with the overall commander’s objective.17 The German army encouraged 
aggressive tactics and their default was to attack or counter-attack from nearly every 
situation, even in the face of a numerical disadvantage, or even when circumstances 
seemed unfavourable. The Germans were also proponents of combined arms warfare and 
their frequent military exercises stressed cooperation between the different arms of 
service. They practised manoeuvre warfare (Bewegungskrieg) where they favoured 
mobility over remaining static (Stellungskrieg). The Germans sought to manoeuvre their 
forces to place them in the most advantageous position where they could overwhelm an 
unsuspecting enemy. Often Germans would attempt to encircle their opponent and after 
that, try to destroy them in a cauldron battle (Kesselshlacht). Colonel Paul von Lettow-
Vorbeck was a product of this German military training and his conduct of the GEA 
campaign, as commander of the German forces, conformed to the prescribed German 
doctrine of the time.18 
 
 The UDF’s military doctrine was a derivation of a combination of the forces which 
took part in the Anglo-Boer War. The Boers and subsequently the UDF, were certainly 
averse to conducting expensive and often futile frontal attacks. The Boers manoeuvred to 
fight while the British, tied into their large logistic needs, fought in order to manoeuvre. 
Richard Meinertzhagen (1878–1967), an observer, participant, and a bitter critic of the 
                                                          
tendencies brought about by the Boer War that are reflected in Infantry Training 1902. He 
maintains that the new training manuals reverted to “a thoroughly offensive spirit” and 
that “… it is hoped that the attack with its strong moral backing will always remain the 
bedrock of our training”, pp ix, x. 
16.  Differences in conditions between southern Africa and Europe consisted of the abnormally 
good visibility in Africa compared to Europe, the large distances, poor infrastructure, 
different weather patterns and local terrain features which included the semi-arid nature 
of the battlefield. 
17.  F. Halder, Analysis of U.S. Field Service Regulations, MS No. P-133 (Historical Division, United 
States Army, Europe, 1953). Halder defined German leadership as a capacity for 
independent action and a willingness to shoulder responsibility with a moral obligation to 
adhere to the mission and an ability to make complete clear and unambiguous decisions to 
establish a point of main effort. 
18.  Robert Citino has contributed greatly to the understanding of the German way of war. See 
R.M. Citino, The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920-39 
(Stackpole, Mechanicsburg, 1999); and R.M. Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht: The German 
Campaigns of 1942 (University Press of Kansas, Kansas City, 2007). 
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conduct of the war in GEA, gives some insight into the British penchant for frontal assault 
and he explained it thus:  
 
Manoeuvre is a peculiar form of war which I do not understand and which I doubt will 
succeed except at great expense in men and money. … A series of manoeuvres will only 
drag operations on for years. Smuts should bring him [Lettow-Vorbeck] to battle and 
instead of manoeuvring him out of position, should endeavour to surround and 
annihilate him, no matter what are our casualties.19 
  
The Boer forces were highly mobile, being essentially formed from mounted 
infantry. They preferred to manoeuvre by conducting a strategic offensive and a tactical 
defensive. Through manoeuvre and high mobility, they often forced the British to attack 
in circumstances unfavourable to the attacker. Therefore, the Boers used their superior 
mobility to ensure that they would conduct a battle on ground of their choosing. Their 
superior mobility also allowed them to retreat out of harm’s way should conditions on the 
battlefield warrant a withdrawal. The Boer style of command allowed for a greater amount 
of initiative on the battlefield compared to their British opponents.20 However, this 
freedom to exercise initiative was often unbridled and practised out of the confines of an 
overall objective as prescribed in German doctrine. The lack of a formal conventional 
command structure in the Boer forces often led to unexpected results on the battlefield. 
The South African mounted forces supplied to GEA were distinctly Afrikaner in origin, 
while the foot infantry tended to be predominantly of English extraction.21 As a result, the 
UDF was an interesting combination of opposing doctrines and former enemies.22 Smuts 
and the UDF adopted this way of war and put it into practice with good effect in GSWA and 
with mixed results in GEA. The UDF, under British command, was unable to exercise its 
manoeuvre doctrine at Salaita Hill as practised successfully in GSWA in 1915 under Botha 
and the Kilimanjaro operations in GEA in 1916 under Smuts. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19.  R. Meinertzhagen, Army Diary, 1899–1926 (Oliver & Boyd, London, 1960), p 166. 
20.  Colonel Callwell offered his famous description of the Boers just prior to the outbreak of 
war, as well-armed, educated and led by men of knowledge and repute but “merely bodies 
of determined men, acknowledging certain leaders, drawn together to confront a common 
danger”. See C.E. Callwell, Small War: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers (HMSO, 
London, 1896), p 27. 
21.  In Meinertzhagen’s view, “The Dutch mounted brigade should do us well, for the men’s 
physique is splendid and their morale high.” See Meinertzhagen, Army Diary, p 164. 
22.  Anderson is less than complimentary about the UDF (Smuts’s) way of war. In this he 
differed very little from the consensus among British generals of the time, and most 
contemporary British historians. See R. Anderson, ‘JC Smuts and JL van Deventer: South 
African Commanders-in-Chief of a British Expeditionary Force’, Scientia Miltaria, 31, 
2(2003).  
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The lead-up to the battle of Salaita Hill  
 
Salaita Hill was a strategic outpost constructed on British East African soil and held by the 
Germans as part of a defensive system deployed in depth. Salaita was the first in a series 
of defensive positions occupied by the Germans, which guarded the Taveta Gap, the 
gateway to Kenya/GEA (see Map 1). Its forward position also facilitated the raiding of the 
British logistical infrastructure. Raiding was an activity the Germans engaged in often with 
great success and to the extreme irritation of the British.23 Salaita Hill afforded the 
Germans a useful observation post providing the only high ground astride the single road 
leading to Taveta, on an otherwise flat almost featureless plateau. The impenetrable Pare 
Mountains in the south and the dominating Kilimanjaro to the north flanked the 25 
kilometre Taveta Gap.  
 
The British fared poorly in the GEA campaign thus far and there was concern that 
this was, “damaging to our prestige among the native races”.24 Most importantly, Salaita 
was one of the only pieces of British territory that the Germans occupied in the First World 
War.25 The political value of removing them from this piece of British real estate placed 
immense pressure on the military to do so as soon as it was possible. The arrival of strong 
South African forces in Kenya in February 1916, presented the British with an opportunity 
to remove the Germans before the arrival of Smuts. The British conducted the Salaita 
operation in terms of a strategy to be undertaken before the onset of the rains in April 
termed, “preliminary operations.” These operations would consist of capturing strong 
German outposts in British East Africa to restore prestige and provide sound jumping off 
points when the rains ceased in June.26 
  
Malleson found himself in command of the British 2nd Division, which was 
earmarked to launch the attack on Salaita Hill. He was relatively inexperienced having 
seen very little in the way of combat and even less time in command (see Figure 1). 
Meinertzhagen describes Malleson as having no knowledge of command and, 
 
… a bad man, clever as a monkey, but hopelessly unreliable and with a nasty record 
behind him. He is by far the cleverest man out here, but having spent all his service in 
an Ordinance Office, knows very little about active operations and still less of the usual 
courtesies amongst British officers. He comes from a class which would wreck the 
                                                          
23.  The National Archives UK, Kew (hereafter TNA), War Office (hereafter WO) 106/310 f17 
(1), Smith-Dorrien, “Appreciation of the Situation in East Africa”, 1 December 1915. The 
railway from Mombasa to Nairobi received particular attention from the Germans. 
24.  TNA, WO 106/310 f20, “General Staff Appreciations, Future Conduct of the War”, 16 
December 1915. 
25.  The Germans also occupied Nakob briefly; this was a border post on the northern 
Cape/GSWA border.   
26.  TNA, WO 106/310 f20, “General Staff Appreciations, Future Conduct of the War”, 16 
December 1915. 
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Empire to advance himself. … [He] is loathed and despised as an overbearing bully, ill 
mannered, and a rotten soldier.27  
 
Meinertzhagen was not alone in rating Malleson’s generalship as below par and Smuts was 
less than complimentary when he canvassed for his removal on the 15 March 1916 after 
Malleson asked to be relieved of his command “owing to serious indisposition”: 
 
I regret to say that after the Salaita fiasco on the 12 February there is very little 
confidence in the fighting ability of Malleson and a change in the command of the 1st 
East African Brigade is also desirable; Tighe considers him a capable administrator 
and I hope his talents could be  better employed by the War Office in an administrative 
capacity.28 
 
The South African exploratory mission to GEA at the end of 1915 found Major-
General Tighe to be of “nervous manner, lacking in strength of character and forcefulness, 
lacks experience of conducting operations of a large scale, cannot look at things from a big 
point of view [and] does not realise the use to which mounted troops can be put …” Hughes 
and Van Deventer were even less complimentary about Brigadier-General Malleson. 
“Neither of us were impressed by this officer… he was not a big man in the sense of being 
strong and resourceful.”29 
 
 On 1 May 1915, Malleson assumed command of the Voi area, which extended from 
the coast to Kilimanjaro. On 13 July 1915, he advanced on Mbuyuni with 1 100 men, eight 
machine guns, and three pieces of artillery. He launched an attack on the morning of 14 
July against the entrenched German positions, after a night march to bring them into 
position. It took the form of a frontal assault supplemented with a weak flanking attack on 
the enemy left.30 The entire operation harked back to the tactics employed by the British 
in the opening stages of the Anglo-Boer War – with disastrous results. In this unsuccessful 
action, he suffered casualties of 170 men and one machine gun. He delivered a frontal 
attack on a carefully prepared position against a numerically superior enemy with no hope 
of success.31 Capell sums up the result of the fiasco as “… strengthening of the already fine 
morale of the enemy”.32 It was an inauspicious beginning to an unremarkable combat 
career. 
                                                          
27.  Meinertzhagen, Army Diary, pp 108, 123, 149, 153. 
28.  TNA, WO 141/62 f15, J.C. Smuts, “Precis: Colonel Malleson”, 15 March 1916.  
29.  National Defence Force Documentation Centre, Pretoria (hereafter DOCD), 3rd South 
African Infantry Brigade, Box 6, Report of Lieutenant-Colonel A.M. Hughes and Lieutenant-
Colonel Dirk van Deventer, 26 November 1915. 
30.  TNA, WO 95/5345/15 f59, War Diary, 130th King George’s Own Baluchis, Report on the 
Action at Mbuyuni, 14 July 1915. 
31.  C. Hordern, Military Operations East Africa, Volume 1, August 1914–September 1916 (His 
Britannic Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1941), p 156. 
32.  A.E. Capell, The Second Rhodesia Regiment in East Africa (Naval and Military Press, Uckfield, 
2006), p 30. Lieutenant-Colonel Capell was commander of the 2nd Rhodesia Regiment. 
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With little success or experience behind his name, Malleson drew up operational 
orders on 11 February 1916 for an attack on the German positions at Salaita Hill. His 
motivation for the attack before the arrival of Smuts, according to Malleson, was an order 
he received on 10 February 1916, that he was to capture the hill before 14 February. These 
orders apparently originated from General Sir Horace Lockwood Smith-Dorrien (1858–
1930) in South Africa, travelling en route to assume the command in East Africa.33  
 
Smith-Dorrien received his appointment as the general officer in command of East 
Africa on 22 November 1915. Unfortunately, he contracted pneumonia on his voyage to 
South Africa and was unable to take up his command. The orders first took the form of a 
query issued by Smith-Dorrien on 4 February 1916 to Major-General M. Tighe, 
commander of the British forces in East Africa, asking when he would attack Salaita Hill. 
Tighe replied on the 7 February that he would attack Salaita between 12 and 14 
February.34 There is little evidence to suggest that Smith-Dorrien or anyone else informed 
Smuts of this planned attack on Salaita Hill when the latter replaced him on short notice. 
It is unlikely that Smuts would have condoned a frontal attack of this nature. 
 
The British appointed Smuts as Smith-Dorrien’s successor on 6 February 1916 and 
he arrived in East Africa on 19 February.35 It seems strange that the British would launch 
a major attack before the arrival of Smuts on a query issued by Smith-Dorrien on 4 
February 1916. Logic dictates that the new commander would have wanted to be present 
at the scene, instead of languishing on a ship sailing for East Africa. The suggestion for the 
attack emanated from Smith-Dorrien who was no longer in command and the attack took 
place a day after Smuts departed for East Africa.36 It seems that Malleson and Tighe were 
anxious for a victory before Smuts’s arrival. 
 
                                                          
33.  National Archives Record Services of South Africa, Pretoria (hereafter NARSA), Jan Smuts 
Papers (hereafter JSP), A1 Box 390, Malleson Papers on Salaita Hill Engagement in East 
Africa Campaign, 1916–1918, “Notes on the Action at Salaita”, Appendix III. See also TNA, 
WO 106/310 f20, General Staff Appreciations, Future Conduct of the War, 16 December 
1915. The attack was in terms of a general vision for the theatre drawn up in December 
1915. 
34.  Hordern, Military Operations East Africa, Volume 1, p 230.  
35.  J.J. Collyer, The South Africans with General Smuts in German East Africa (Government 
Printer, Pretoria, 1939), p 52. 
36.  Hordern, Military Operations East Africa, Volume 1, p 230. Major-General Michael Tighe 
replied in response to a query from Smith-Dorrien on the 7 February that he would attack 
Salaita between the 12 and 14 February. 
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Map 1: Satellite image showing Salaita Hill in relation to Kilimanjaro and the Pare 
 Mountains. Salaita was a strategic point guarding the gate to German East 
 Africa known as the Taveta Gap. 
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This was not the first time that the British attempted to assail Salaita. The previous 
effort took place on 29 March 1915 and took the form of a probing attack by two 
companies, two machine guns and a single artillery piece.37 Meinertzhagen described the 
assault as “aimless, objectless and dangerous”. Major G. Newcome, true to prevailing 
British doctrine, executed an unimaginative frontal assault on the hill. A German counter-
attack on the right flank readily reinforced by the main German base at Taveta a mere 10 
kilometres away, drove him back. The British attack failed miserably with five killed and 
two machine guns abandoned in the panic of retreat.38 The way the Germans were able to 
reinforce Salaita rapidly and launch a flank attack was a precursor to what Malleson could 
expect when he attacked. According to Malleson’s post-battle report, he expected the 
South Africans to encounter the German “hostile reserves” that he believed resided on the 
west side of Salaita Hill. Therefore, any flank attack could have reasonably anticipated stiff 
resistance at any time in their manoeuvre.39 
 
Malleson resolved to launch his attack with a bit more imagination and flair than 
that of Newcome. He was determined to remove the enemy on Salaita via a turning 
movement, which would envelop the German positions on the hill from the north (see 
Malleson’s Map 3). The Divisional War Diary makes it clear that the intention of the attack 
was to remove the enemy and secure Salaita Hill.40 The newly arrived, fresh 
(inexperienced) South Africans would conduct this flanking manoeuvre. The Germans 
would be pinned on their front by the veteran 1st East African Infantry Brigade, a 
formation which had seen most of the action in the campaign thus far. Thus, Malleson 
chose to leave it to the “green”, recently arrived41 South Africans, to execute a flanking 
manoeuvre against an enemy who had rebuffed similar assaults on two previous occasions 
at Salaita on 29 March 1915 and Mbuyuni on 14 July 1915.42 Malleson comments on the 
South African’s inexperience in a note he penned on the 20 April 1917: 
 
So far as I am aware the South Africans were the only overseas contingent put straight 
into the field. All other contingents had months of thorough training in England or 
Egypt before being sent into the field. Br[igadier] General Berenge [sic, Berrange], 
                                                          
37.  TNA, WO 95/5345/15 f11, War Diary 130th King Georges Own Baluchis, 29 March 1915. 
Casualties were 14 killed, wounded and missing; 2 machine guns had to be abandoned.  
38.  Hordern, Military Operations East Africa, Volume 1, pp 143,144. See also Meinertzhagen, 
Army Diary, p 122. 
39.  NARSA, JSP, A1 Box 390, Malleson Papers on Salaita Hill Engagement in East Africa 
Campaign, Official Report on the Action at Salaita Hill, 12 February 1918, Appendix II. 
Collyer, The South Africans with General Smuts, p 55, emphasises the high expectation of a 
German counter-attack. 
40.  TNA, WO 95/5345/12 f55, War Diary 1st East African Division, Operation Order no. 2, 11 
February 1916. 
41.  E. Paice, Tip and Run (Phoenix, London, 2008), p 177. The South Africans began arriving on 
19 January 1916.  
42.  Hordern, Military Operations East Africa, Volume 1, p 231. 
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Commanding 3rd S.A. Brigade, told me that the greater portion of his men had been 
given their arms and uniform on board the transport at Durban.43 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Brigadier-General Wilfrid Malleson (1866–1946)44 
  
 
The South African troops were woefully undertrained; the time between 
recruitment and seeing their first action, amounted to only a matter of weeks.45 Although 
many of the officers were veterans of the Anglo-Boer War there was a shortage of 
experienced NCOs. Most of the men were hastily recruited, undertrained teenagers and 
there was little time to hone them into an effective fighting force.46 
 
                                                          
43.  NARSA, JSP, A1 Box 390, Malleson Papers on Salaita Hill Engagement in East Africa 
Campaign, 1916–1918, Official report on the action at Salaita Hill, 12 February 1918, 
Appendix II. 
44.  J. Watt, "The Eye of Revelation" available at <http://jr-books.com/EoR-Article-101115-
MallesonPhoto.html> (Accessed 16 June 2016). 
45.  Collyer, The South Africans with General Smuts, pp 58, 59. 
46.  Paice, Tip and Run, p 177. 
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Malleson’s plan of attack on Salaita Hill   
 
Malleson’s decision to split his holding forces (1st East African Brigade) and his offensive 
brigade (2nd South African Infantry Brigade) equally, worked against the basic principle 
in warfare of concentration and economy of force.47 The South African outflanking 
manoeuvre was clearly the point of maximum effort and as such should have attracted the 
bulk of the troops available. As it was, there was no discernible reserve placed under 
Brigadier-General P.S. Beves’s (1863–1924) command to reinforce success, or if 
necessary, to ward off an enemy counterattack (see Table 2). It was counter-intuitive to 
the principle of unity of command, whereby unity of effort develops by appointing a 
responsible commander and placing the necessary resources at his disposal to reach the 
objective. The flank attack could have achieved an overwhelming superiority had Malleson 
thinned out the static forces holding the western front of Salaita and creating a reserve for 
the flanking attack. 
 
 The brunt of the turning movement was conducted by the 2nd South African 
Infantry Brigade under Beves, a veteran brigade commander under Brigadier-General Sir 
Duncan McKenzie in the GSWA campaign. Beves served as a captain in the Anglo-Boer War 
in a regular British infantry regiment and saw extensive action at Lombard’s Kop and the 
defence of Ladysmith. He went on to command a battalion from 4 September 1900 to 15 
May 1901. After the war he commanded the Transvaal Volunteers until 1912 and then 
became commandant of cadets in the UDF.48 Collyer describes him as, “an officer of 
Regimental experience, careful, and attentive to the comforts and needs of those whom he 
commanded”. 49 Malleson is at pains to explain that he did not design the action, especially 
the flanking movement, to manoeuvre the Germans out of Salaita. To do so would have 
risked the intervention of the 6 000 German troops in the Taveta vicinity and he did not 
                                                          
47.  J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (US Army Command & General Staff 
College Press, Kansas City, 1993). Fuller set out nine basic principles of warfare in his book. 
These have seen some variation over time. They are i) Aim/Objective: Setting an aim with 
a clear set of measurable objectives; ii) Concentration: Point of maximum effort or focal 
point to meet the objective; iii) Offensive: Gain and maintain the initiative. Dictate the time, 
place, purpose, scope, intensity, and pace of operations; iv) Economy of Force: Direct bulk 
of resources to primary objective and minimum of combat power on secondary objectives; 
v) Surprise: Strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared; vi) 
Manoeuvre/Mobility: Outmanoeuvre the enemy using superior mobility and flexibility; vii) 
Security: Protect operations from enemy actions; viii) Simplicity: Avoid unnecessary 
complexity in preparing, planning, and conducting military operations; and ix) Unity of 
Command: Unity of effort for every objective under one responsible commander. 
48.  DOCD, Personnel File, P.S. Beves, Record of Service. Beves died on 26 September 1924 of 
complications due to the malaria he contracted while serving in German East Africa. 
49.  I. Uys, South African Military Who's Who, 1452–1992 (Fortress, Germiston, 1992), p 18; 
Collyer, The South Africans with General Smuts, p 54. Beves had served as a captain in the 
Boer War in a regular British infantry regiment and thereafter commanded the Transvaal 
Volunteer Force until 1912, when he became commandant of cadets in the UDF. 
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have the luxury of the extra 10 000 soldiers that Smuts fielded a month later. He was 
fearful of “splitting up” an already inferior force that a deeper flanking attack would 
require.50  
  
Common sense would dictate that Malleson should have assigned the more difficult 
role of enveloping Salaita to the more experienced 1st East African Infantry Brigade rather 
than the relatively inexperienced 2nd South African Infantry Brigade. They had barely 
arrived in GEA and had little time to acclimatise or train in their new surroundings.51 
Malleson himself comments that the South Africans were the only contingent put straight 
into battle. “All other contingents had months of thorough training in England or Egypt 
before being sent to the field.”52 It would have been more prudent to allow the South 
Africans to assume the static role in front of Salaita, which would have afforded them a 
valuable learning experience against a veteran enemy who was the wily victor of many 
battles. However, Malleson in his wisdom seems to have felt that his veteran troops 
deserved a break after being continuously on campaign for many months.  
  
The depth of Malleson’s proposed outflanking manoeuvre can also be called into 
question. The further north and thus the wider the manoeuvre described by the 
outflanking units, the more the German positions at Salaita would be unhinged. A 
manoeuvre designed to arrive in the rear of Salaita would have disrupted the supply lines 
to those defending the hill, forcing the Germans to either abandon their positions or launch 
a counter-attack on a numerically superior enemy on ground of the enemy’s choosing. The 
main weakness of Salaita was that it did not have a supply of water. The defenders of 
Salaita carried in every drop of water from the west and this supply line was extremely 
vulnerable to disruption, which would have made the defence of Salaita untenable.53 As it 
was, Malleson’s flanking attack was a very shallow affair, barely stretching 2 kilometres to 
the Germans left flank on the hill. The lack of depth of the attack allowed the Germans the 
opportunity to extend their flank and meet their attackers from prepared positions close 
to Salaita. If one compares Malleson’s hand-drawn map (Map 2) to the map in Collyer’s 
official history (Map 3), it is immediately apparent that the South African flanking 
manoeuvre was even shallower than Malleson had intended. The South African 
outflanking manoeuvre had unintentionally developed into a frontal assault and they 
delivered it well to the northeast instead of to the northwest.     
  
                                                          
50.  NARSA, JSP, A1 Box 390, Malleson Papers on Salaita Hill Engagement in East Africa 
Campaign, 1916–1918, Notes on the action at Salaita, Appendix III. 
51.  Paice, Tip and Run, p 177. The South Africans began arriving in German East Africa on 14 
January 1916 and were in action at Salaita a mere four weeks later. 
52. NARSA, JSP, A1 Box 390, Malleson Papers on Salaita Hill Engagement in East Africa 
Campaign, 1916–1918, Official report on the action at Salaita Hill 12 February 1918, 
Appendix II. 
53.  P.E von Lettow-Vorbeck, My Reminiscences of East Africa (Hurst & Blackett, London, 1920), 
pp 79, 80. 
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Malleson does offer his reasons for resorting to a tactical solution rather than 
launching a flanking manoeuvre at the operational level. He explains his motivation for 
adopting a shallow outflanking manoeuvre as follows: 
 
The information supplied by G.H.Q was to the effect that the enemy had in and around 
Taveta, which is in close supporting distance of Salaita, not less than 6 000 men. As I 
could not bring more than 4 500 rifles to the actual attack there could be no question 
of trying to manoeuvre the enemy out of Salaita, as was possible a month later with 10 
000 additional troops, as to make any attempt would have involved splitting up an 
already inferior force, and thus risk defeat in detail.54 
 
Therefore, using dubious numbers as an excuse not to launch a more imaginative 
attack, Malleson resorted to what turned out to be a costly unimaginative frontal assault 
on a well-prepared position without the element of surprise.  
At the outset, the British underestimated the enemy forces facing them, despite the 
ground and air reconnaissance undertaken in the few days before the operation.55 They 
estimated the German strength to be in the region of 300 men entrenched with machine 
guns but with no artillery.56 However, this flies in the face of a report produced by 
Malleson, shortly after the battle, where he speaks of intelligence reporting the availability 
of 2 000 Germans near Salaita.57 One can compare this with the actual figures shown in 
Table 1. Malleson, despite the woeful underestimation of the forces in front of him 
(according to the British official history), did enjoy a substantial numerical superiority in 
men, machine guns, and artillery. According to Malleson’s account directly after the battle 
and then again 14 months later, he expected there to be considerable German resistance 
when he attacked Salaita. The result of the battle would depend on the skilful use, or 
otherwise, of his numerical advantage in directing his forces to the centre of gravity of his 
attack (Schwerpunkt).  
                                                          
54.  NARSA, JSP, A1 Box 390, Malleson Papers on Salaita Hill Engagement in East Africa 
Campaign, 1916–1918, Notes on the action at Salaita, Appendix III. 
55.  Hordern, Military Operations East Africa, Volume 1, p 230; Collyer, The South Africans with 
General Smuts, p 54. See also P.J. Sampson, “The Conquest of German East”, in The Nongquai 
Special Commemoration Issue (Argus, Pretoria, 1917), where Sampson writes: “The 
trenches on the hill itself appear to have been devised for the sole purpose of misleading 
our airmen and intelligence men generally”, p 14. 
56.  TNA, WO 95/5345/12 f42 War Diary, 1st East African Division, Operation Order no. 1, 2 
February 1916. The operation order estimates 200 enemy and 2 Maxim machine guns 
defending Salaita on 2 February. See also Hordern, Military Operations East Africa, Volume 
1, p 231. 
57.  NARSA, JSP, A1 Box 390, Malleson Papers on Salaita Hill Engagement in East Africa 
Campaign, 1916–1918, Official report on the action at Salaita Hill, 12 February 1918, 
Appendix II. See also TNA, WO 95/5345/12 f47, War Diary 1st East African Division, 
Operation Order no. 4, 6 February 1916. German strength in and around Taveta was 
estimated as not exceeding 3 000. 
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Map 2: A map drawn by Malleson’s hand, describing the action at Salaita and the difficult terrain 
encountered. What is interesting is the route taken by the South Africans in their flanking 
manoeuvre, which seems at odds with that described by Collyer.58  
 
                                                          
58.  NARSA, JSP, A1 Box 390, Malleson Papers on Salaita Hill Engagement in East Africa 
Campaign, 1916–1918, Notes on the action at Salaita, Appendix III. 
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Table 1: The opposing forces present at Salaita Hill, 12 February 1916. The British enjoyed a   
significant numerical advantage over the German defenders.59 
  
Besides getting the numbers wrong, Malleson grossly underestimated the fighting 
power of the enemy and its ability to move reinforcements situated some 7 kilometres 
away from the battlefield quickly into battle. The British plan depended on a preconceived 
notion that they could capture Salaita Hill before the enemy was able to send 
reinforcements. They also underrated the strength of the enemy defences after two 
previous unsuccessful attacks on the same positions. The Germans occupied the same 
ground for many months and made full use of the many opportunities to build formidable 
all-around defences and reconnoitre the area thoroughly.60 Then too, the South Africans 
were guilty of making light of the resourcefulness and skill of the enemy, dismissing them 
as mostly native troops. Their contempt for the enemy matched their low regard for the 
Indian soldiers who ironically come to their rescue in the aftermath of the fiasco of 
Salaita.61 
 
 Beves received his divisional order on 11/12 February, the night before the 
operation; it stated that his brigade would attack the enemy positions to the northeast of 
                                                          
59.  The table is derived from Collyer, The South Africans with General Smuts, pp 53, 54. 
60.  On inspecting the hill some weeks later, it was found that: “The hill was practically 
impregnable with concrete gun emplacements and rifle pits beautifully concealed, barbed 
wire entanglements and, of course, plenty of dummy trenches…” See Sampson, 'The 
Conquest of German East', p 14. See also J.H.V. Crowe, General Smuts' Campaign in East 
Africa (John Murray, London, 1918), p 56. The Germans prepared for an all-round defence 
of Salaita. 
61.  DOCD, 3rd South African Infantry Brigade, Box 6, Report of Captain Frank Douglas, 17 
December 1915. References to the South African troops’ tendency to denigrate and dismiss 
the fighting qualities of “native” troops, friend or foe, appear in many of the secondary 
sources. This primary source gives credence to the notion that the South Africans were 
indeed dangerously dismissive before the Battle of Salaita Hill. See also C.P. Fendall, The 
East African Force 1915–1919: The First World War in Colonial Africa (Leonaur Publishing, 
Driffield, 2014), p 40. 
Opposing Forces Salaita Hill 12 February 1916 German East Africa 
German German German British Force Ratio
Frontline Reserves Total Total
Rifles 1400 600 2000 6000 3 : 1
Machine Guns 12 12 41 3,4 : 1
Field Artillery 2 2 14 7 : 1
Heavy Artillery 0 4 ∞
Armoured Cars 0 0 4 ∞
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Salaita Hill. Beves prudently sought further information as to the proposed action that 
would take place subsequent to the occupation of the enemy positions. Malleson informed 
Beves that no discussion would be entertained on the actual orders.62 Beves took the 
opportunity to raise several concerns on the execution of the operation. He was 
apprehensive about the lack of surprise because his brigade would be in full view from 
Salaita Hill from several miles distant. Furthermore, the enemy was able to reinforce his 
positions swiftly from Taveta some 11 kilometres away, allowing for a possible counter-
attack. Beves pointed out that he was short of a battalion (the 8th SAI Battalion had not 
yet arrived) and requested a replacement battalion to bolster his exposed flank. Finally, 
he requested intensive artillery preparation and after that, the full cooperation of the 
artillery during the attack. He was fearful that artillery cooperation would not be possible 
in the event of a counter-attack launched by the Germans in the bush.63  
 
However, Malleson placated Beves and gave him assurances that he would make 
adequate artillery support available and that the assault would be over before the 
Germans could launch an effective counter-attack. He was also confident that Belfield’s 
Scouts, by conducting reconnaissance far in advance of the South Africans, would be able 
to alert them promptly of any enemy movement towards them that emanated from 
Taveta.64 
 
 As it turned out, there was little in the way of a combined arms approach because 
the artillery was unresponsive to the immediate needs of the infantry on the changing 
battlefield. Malleson reduced the role of the artillery to that of softening up the enemy 
positions on Salaita in an opening bombardment reminiscent of the “the Aldershot set-
piece in three acts” applied in the Anglo-Boer War. For the main part, the artillery was 
unable to respond to the German counterattack and give support to the South Africans. 
Once the infantry became mobile on the right flank and the battle became fluid, the South 
Africans were unable to communicate effectively with the artillery to call for close support. 
The artillery also failed to respond and alter their bombardment when they discovered 
that the enemy’s main defensive trench line was at the foot of Salaita rather than at the 
summit. The Boers used the same tactic at Magersfontein on 11 December 1899 against 
the British and the South Africans should not have been surprised at the position of the 
German trenches.65  
  
                                                          
62.  Collyer, The South Africans with General Smuts, pp 54, 55. 
63.  Collyer, The South Africans with General Smuts, p 55. 
64.  Collyer, The South Africans with General Smuts, p 55. 
65.  The Boers entrenched their forces at the foot of the hills rather than the forward slopes, as 
was the accepted practice. 
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Table 2: The order of battle for the opposing sides 
 
The battle for Salaita Hill commences, 12 February 1916 
 
The two brigades set off at dawn on 12 February from the Serengeti camp (see Table 2). 
They reached the Njoro riverbed 2½ kilometres apart at 06:45 and there were issued with 
orders for the attack. Malleson envisaged enveloping Salaita Hill from the north while 
Belfield’s Scouts and two armoured cars guarded the right flank, and the mounted infantry 
and a further two armoured cars guarded the left flank of the South Africans. The Pioneers 
deployed in the riverbed to improve ramps and search for mines.66 The South Africans 
positioned themselves to the northwest of Salaita, when an hour later, two reconnaissance 
planes reported a sighting of newly dug German trenches, which extended northwards 
from the hill.67 The diary entry of an eyewitness, E.S. Thompson, brings the moment to life. 
 
Reveille 0230. Marched on to the road and waited for daylight when we advanced and 
struck off to the right through the bush. After we had advanced about an hour we 
halted and an aeroplane came flying overhead and flew round the fort. We again 
                                                          
66.  DOCD, War Diary of 2nd South African Infantry Brigade, 3 February 1916, WWI GSWA, Box 
77. See also Paice, Tip and Run, p 180. 
67.  NARSA, JSP, A1 Box 390, Malleson Papers on Salaita Hill Engagement in East Africa 
Campaign, 1916–1918, Official report on the Action at Salaita Hill, 12 February 1916, 
Appendix II. See also Hordern, Military Operations East Africa, Volume 1, p 232. Collyer 
attests to the ineffectiveness of the artillery in silencing the German machine guns when 
he writes that “the enemy positions were most cunningly concealed”. See Collyer, The South 
Africans with General Smuts, p 13.  
Order of Battle at Salaita Hill 12 February 1916
German British
Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck Brigadier-General Wilfrid Malleson
1 FK 1st East African Infantry Brigade
14 FK 2 Loyal North Lancashire Regiment
15 FK 2 Rhodesia  Regiment
18 FK 130 Baluchis Regiment
30 FK
6 Shutz K 2nd South African Infantry Brigade
5 SAI Regiment
6 FK 6 SAI Regiment
9 FK 7 SAI Regiment
24 FK
Divisional Troops
Mounted Infantry Company
Belfields Scouts (60 men mounted)
61st Pioneers
Various artillery units
4 Armoured cars
Major Georg Kraut
(1400 men)
Capt Shulz
(600 men)
Brig-Gen 
P.S. Beves
(Maj P.H. Dyke)
(Lt-Col J.J. Byron)
(Lt-Col J.C. Freeth)
(Lt-Col  GM.J. Molyneux)
(Lt-Commander Whittal)
(Lt-Col A. Capell)
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advanced and when we had gone about 400 yards [366 metres] Jock Young found that 
he had left his rifle behind and went back to get it but couldn't find it. We still advanced 
with the 6th Regiment on our right and the Armoured Motors and Headquarters Staff 
on our left. We had advanced into an open space when suddenly we heard shells 
whistling over our heads and bursting about 30 yds [28 metres] behind us. At first 
there was a momentary pause then we all scampered for cover and a few more shells 
came along. For my part I was too excited to be frightened. After 5 minutes we were 
given the order to advance through the bush. Our howitzers now began firing and it 
was a fine sight, seeing the shells bursting round the trenches. When we got closer up 
they began firing at us with rifles so we got into cover and unpacked the guns. We kept 
on advancing and then the wounded began coming back.68 
  
The South Africans continued their march and at 08:00, the 5th, 6th and 7th, SAI 
battalions deployed 1 000 metres from the northwest of Salaita Hill (see Map 3). The 
artillery came into action at 09:00 and began to bombard the German positions on the top 
and slopes of the hill. The artillery fire was mostly ineffective because the Germans 
occupied the trenches on the base of the hill rather than on its slopes.69 The 7th battalion 
halted some 500 metres from the German entrenchments at the base of the hill and began 
to take effective fire from the partially cleared fields of fire.70 Beves, in response, sent his 
6th battalion to extend his line and thus develop the enveloping movement on his right. 
He kept the 5th battalion and his four remaining mountain guns in reserve. Beves lost 
touch with his mounted troops (Belfield’s Scouts) as they disappeared out of sight to the 
north.71 Captain James commanded the machine gun battery, which Malleson attached to 
the South Africans for the day. He reported, after the battle, that the South Africans did not 
build up a proper firing line and the men were reluctant to open fire because of the enemy 
attention it would attract.72 
 
 The attack hardly came as a surprise to the Germans who noticed the preparations 
as early as 9 February. One of these was an abortive reconnaissance in force against Salaita 
made by the 2nd Rhodesian Regiment and the 130th Baluchis and artillery elements on 3 
February 1916.73 The attack involved two South African regiments in support, as well as 
                                                          
68.  E.S. Thompson, "A Machine Gunner’s Odyssey through German East Africa: The Diary of ES 
Thompson, Part I, 17 January to 24 May 1916", South African Military History Journal, 7, 4 
(1987). 
69.  Sampson writes: “The enemy forces apparently were not on the hill at all, but in a cleverly 
constructed trench among the bush at the very foot of the hill. The searching bombardment 
of the hill by our guns, therefore had no effect, and it is doubtful if any of our shells touched 
the enemy’s real trenches at the foot of the hill.” See Sampson, “The Conquest of German 
East”, p 14. 
70.  Collyer, The South Africans with General Smuts, p 56. 
71.  Hordern, Military Operations East Africa, Volume 1, p 232. 
72.  TNA, WO 141/62 f6, Memorandum Colonel Malleson to Secretary of the Army, 6 July 1916. 
73.  DOCD, “War Diary of 2nd South African Infantry Brigade”, 3 February 1916, WWI GSWA, 
Box 77. See also Hordern, Military Operations East Africa, Volume 1, p 230. A 
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an artillery barrage on the fort at Salaita at the top of the hill. On 5 February the 6th South 
African Infantry Regiment (SAIR) made another reconnaissance and drew fire from 
Salaita.74 On the 9 February, the entire South African Brigade demonstrated in front of 
Salaita.75 It is not surprising that after all the British activity, which included numerous 
aircraft overflights, the Germans suspected an attack in the area.76  
 
 The element of surprise, often the factor in war that gives the attacker the edge, 
was lost. The overflights and various reconnaissance missions and demonstrations 
undertaken in the days before the attack had alerted the enemy on Malleson’s interest in 
the outpost. Salaita’s dominant position also afforded the defenders a good observation 
post where they were able to spot an enemy attack a good distance away, giving them time 
to reinforce the position. The artillery barrage undertaken in the vain attempt to soften up 
the enemy defences would also alert the Germans prematurely that an attack was 
underway. It was always going to be a difficult ask to try and achieve the element of 
surprise and the better solution was perhaps the one Smuts instituted a month later when 
he bypassed the stronghold and forced the Germans to abandon it. Smuts revealed his 
attitude and Boer way of war in the simple sentence he delivered when he visited the area 
on 20 February 1916. He climbed a tree, surveyed the enemy territory and said: “No 
necessity to attack Salaita.”77 
  
At approximately 09:00, the Germans realised that the British were launching a 
fully-fledged attack and were not a merely demonstrating. The Germans quickly identified 
that the main attack was developing in the north and was descending on the flank. They 
immediately responded and Major Georg Kraut ordered the 15 FK to position themselves 
to attack the South African right wing at 09:15. Captain Shulz did not need any orders and 
he acted on his initiative. He began to advance with three companies to meet the South 
Africans. Kraut issued the order for Shulz to attack at 10:00. In the face of mounting 
                                                          
reconnaissance in force against Salaita was made by the 2nd Rhodesian Regiment and the 
130th Baluchis and artillery elements on 3 February 1916. See Paice, Tip and Run, p 178. 
The South Africans were part of a reconnaissance undertaken on 3 February and 9 
February when the whole brigade took part in a demonstration in front of Salaita Hill. 
74.  DOCD, “War Diary of 2nd South African Infantry Brigade”, 5 February 1916, WWI GSWA, 
Box 77. 
75.  DOCD, “War Diary of 2nd South African Infantry Brigade”, 5 February 1916, WWI GSWA, 
Box 77. The purpose of this adventure was to examine roads, and locating mines. The South 
Africans advanced up to 700 meters of the Salaita defences. See also TNA, WO 95/5345/12 
f42, War Diary 1st East African Division, Operation Order no. 8, 8 February 1916. The main 
purpose of the probe according to the divisional operations order was to make the road 
over the Njoro Drift fit for every type of vehicle. The infantry advance was meant to create 
a diversion to cover the work of the engineers and the reconnaissance parties.   
76.  L. Boell, Die Operationen in Ost-Afrika (Walther Dachert,  Hamburg, 1951), p 139. See also 
Paice, Tip and Run, p 177; and Capell, The Second Rhodesia Regiment in East Africa, p 47.  
77.  Capell, The Second Rhodesia Regiment in East Africa, p 53. 
Katz – A clash of military doctrine 
 
41 
 
casualties, Beves now ordered his 7th SAIR to fall back at about 13:0078, at almost the same 
time that the Germans launched a counter-attack against the 6th SAIR with their 15th FK. 
The usual German aggression accompanied their attack. The arrival of the Germans to the 
right of the South Africans threatened to envelop their exposed wing. 
  
 To counter this, Beves sent forth his 5th SAIR to form a defensive flank. However, 
the 5th SAIR soon found itself outflanked in turn by the arrival of the 6th, 9th, and 24th 
FKs under the command of Shulz. The warning by Belfield’s Scouts of the new German 
counter-attack developing came too late for the 5th SAIR and took the South Africans 
completely by surprise.79 In the face of the unexpected German attack, the South Africans 
began to give up ground and retreated in what was to become essentially a rout.80 The 
Germans regrouped at 14:00 and once again went on the attack, pursuing the retreating 
South Africans relentlessly, only to be stopped by the resilient defence of the 130th 
Baluchis.81 It was 130th Baluchis who successfully covered the ignominious South African 
retreat by resisting a bayonet attack and restoring order to the British front. 82  
 
 What had developed on the South African flank was a classic encounter battle or a 
meeting engagement where the opposing sides collided in the field, incompletely deployed 
for battle. All indicators point to the fact that the South Africans were preparing to assault 
fixed entrenched positions on the northwest flank of Salaita. They were surprised to see 
the Germans had abandoned their trenches and that they were perhaps even dummy 
positions. What transpired instead was a manoeuvre battle where each side tried to 
extend its flank to meet the enveloping enemy. It was a battle in which the Germans held 
all the advantages. Their emphasis on devolving decision making down to the lowest levels 
of command (Auftragstaktik) allowed junior officers to make on-the-spot decisions. The 
decisive factors in these types of battle are the initiative of the junior officers and the 
calmness and efficiency of the troops. German training encouraged their troops, when they 
were in doubt, to make for where the sounds of battle are the loudest and charge 
aggressively in that direction immediately. The Germans were veterans of many battles 
while the South Africans were newcomers to war in East Africa. Once the Germans had 
derailed the South Africans from their set-piece attack by appearing on their flank, the 
South Africans became unhinged, then broke in the face of incessant aggressive attacks, 
and then ran. 
                                                          
78.  Sampson, "The Conquest of German East", p 14. 
79.  Hordern, Military Operations East Africa, Volume 1, p 233. 
80.  Collyer, The South Africans with General Smuts, p 57. Collyer admits that several platoons 
of the 7th SAI retired in disorder although no panic set in.  See also Fendall, The East African 
Force, 1915–1919, p 40. The author describes the South Africans as “thoroughly scared”. 
81.  Boell, Die Operationen in Ost-Afrika, p 140. 
82.  TNA, WO 95/5345/15 f146, War Diary 130th King Georges Own Baluchis, Appendix IV, 12 
February 1916. See also Collyer, The South Africans with General Smuts, p 57; and Fendall, 
The East African Force. The South Africans are described as being “contemptuous”, going 
as far as to express their disgust at having to serve alongside Indian soldiers. 
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 The battle for Salaita exposed the weak C3I83 that plagued all the phases and levels 
of the operation. They seem to be little coordination of efforts between the two brigades 
and it is inexplicable that Malleson only put the East African Brigade into action after the 
South Africans had been in a battle for over four hours.84 The South Africans had no 
communication with Divisional Headquarters or with the East African Brigade and they 
were unable to direct the artillery fire to support them.85 Beves lost control over his forces 
once the situation became fluid on the British right. The South African retreat turned into 
panic and then into a rout. Retreating in the face of an aggressive enemy takes great skill 
and coordination and Beves would have done better if he had rather ordered his regiments 
to attack instead of retire.  
 
 
Map 3: The battle for Salaita Hill on 12 February 1916. The map shows how the Germans swiftly 
met the South African flanking movement by quickly extending their line to meet Beves’s 
thrust.86 
  
                                                          
83.  Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. Command and Control is a system 
that empowers a commander to accomplish his mission by marshalling the resources, 
human and logistical to achieve his mission. 
84.  Collyer, The South Africans with General Smuts, p 58. 
85.  Collyer, The South Africans with General Smuts, p 59. 
86.  Collyer, The South Africans with General Smuts.  
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Meanwhile, at 10:45 the 1st East African Brigade was sent forward. The British 
inexplicably held it back up to this point, supposedly to support the South Africans if 
necessary. Their advance soon halted after emerging from the bush into comparatively 
open ground 1 000 meters in front of the German trenches. There they came under heavy 
fire. Confronted with the well-placed German defences they were unable to make any 
further progress forward.87 At 12:00 orders were received to move the entire East African 
Brigade to the north to assist the South Africans in their northeast attack. Before elements 
of the brigade could complete the manoeuvre, a countermanding order was issued to 
attack Salaita directly.88 It seems that Malleson intended the East African Brigade to attack 
only once the South African attack was well underway, according to one regimental 
history. They lay in their positions for more than an hour “subject to heavy shell and 
searching rifle fire”. They were waiting for the South African flank attack to develop before 
advancing themselves. When eventually the order to move forward was given at 13:00,89 
there was a reluctance resulting in hesitation to move out of their relatively safe positions 
to ones that were closer to the enemy and far more vulnerable to their fire. Lieutenant-
Colonel A. Capell, commanding the 2nd Rhodesian Regiment, objected to a verbal 
instruction to move forward and asked for written orders. At that stage, it became 
apparent that the flank attack had failed, and the Rhodesian Regiment began to retreat.90 
  
 The last word describing the trauma inflicted on the South Africans is left for E.S. 
Thompson who graphically describes the impossible chaos of the action and the fog of war 
surrounding the battlefield: 
 
The 5th Regiment then began to retire and acted disgracefully, refusing to halt and 
lie down when ordered. Our Corporal then told us to retire right back so we retired 
till they began shelling us again so we lay flat down. It was at this point that I last 
saw Jock and Bob Thompson. We retired further and got behind some tall trees but 
they again shelled us so we doubled across an open space to the right and got in 
amongst the Indian Mountain Battery. We lay down for about half an hour with 
bullets zipping past all the time. The firing seemed to be coming nearer, then the 
6th retired behind us so we retired right back and then to the right. … then the 
Baluchis who were guarding our rear got behind us so we retired further and got 
behind some trees but they began shelling us again so we got right out of it. By this 
time, I had finished my water and was terribly thirsty and tired. Several men of 'D' 
Company of the 7th got into the first line of trenches but as the 5th would not 
support them had to evacuate the place. Hans Gosch was killed during the retreat. 
He was bending over when he was shot through the back, the bullet coming 
                                                          
87.  TNA, WO 95/5345/15 f146, War Diary 130th King Georges Own Baluchis, Appendix IV, 12 
February 1916. See also Hordern, Military Operations East Africa, Volume 1, p 233. 
88.  TNA, WO 95/5345/12 f55, War Diary 1st East African Division, Operations against Salaita, 
12 February 1916. 
89.  TNA, WO 95/5345/15 f146, War Diary 130th King Georges Own Baluchis, Appendix IV, 12 
February 1916. 
90.  Capell, The Second Rhodesia Regiment in East Africa, p 48. 
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through his jaw and smashing it. Everybody reckons that although it was a very 
hard position to storm we would have won had it not been for the 5th retiring. On 
reading this entry recently, I would say that we had been rather harsh about the 
behaviour of the 5th SAI. As far as I recall it was a case of a few young chaps going 
into a panic and that should not be interpreted as a reflection of the whole 
regiment.91 
 
 According to Malleson, Beves, who narrowly escaped capture, was apologetic and 
told him, “I don’t know what to say for letting you in (sic) like this; I can only deeply 
apologise. My men have gone; it is impossible to rally them here. I am very sorry.” Malleson 
describes the South Africans he encountered as being without discipline and cohesion and 
the officers appeared helpless. Malleson reported that several other officers, beside Beves, 
approached him the next day and apologised profusely for their poor conduct and said 
that the men were, “kicking themselves with shame and disgust”.92 
 
 The fiasco cost the South Africans 139 casualties in a matter of four hours of 
combat, whereas they incurred 288 casualties in the entire German South West African 
campaign.93 German losses were considerably less with one German, 6 Askari and 3 
carriers killed and 3 Germans, 22 Askari and 8 carriers wounded. The Germans captured 
a considerable amount of booty including 40 000 cartridges, 14 7cm artillery shells and 
14 mules.94 The final scorecard fairly reflected the scale of the defeat inflicted on the South 
Africans. 
 
 An obviously shaken Tighe took four days to report the defeat to the Chief of 
Imperial General Staff, Lord Kitchener.95 Kitchener, fully understanding the possible 
political repercussions for South Africa, censured Tighe. He cautioned him not to take 
premature operations that would deprive the newly appointed commander of the East 
African forces, General Smuts, of full liberty of action before his arrival.96 After his arrival 
in GEA shortly after the Battle of Salaita, Smuts did not take immediate action against Tighe 
or Malleson. He gave both men another opportunity to prove their worth. Smuts sought 
and received permission to carry out the operation before the rainy season on 25 
February. Smuts whitewashed the defeat at Salaita in his despatch by saying that the South 
                                                          
91.  Thompson, "A Machine Gunner’s Odyssey".  
92.  TNA, WO 141/62 f6, Memorandum from Colonel Malleson to Secretary of the Army, 6 July 
1916. 
93.  Van der Waag, A Military History of Modern South Africa, p 126. 
94.  Boell, Die Operationen in Ost-Afrika, p 141. 
95.  TNA, WO 33/858, M. Tighe, “Action at Salaita Hill”, Telegram Tighe to Kitchener, 16 
February 1916. 
96.  TNA, WO 33/858, Kitchener, “Action at Salaita Hill”, Telegram Kitchener to Tighe, 18 
February 1916. 
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Africans had learnt “invaluable lessons”.97 Back in South Africa, Botha did his best to keep 
the full extent of the fiasco out of parliament.98 
 
 Smuts launched an attack on 5 March 1916, a mere three weeks after his arrival on 
19 February. His wide enveloping movement forced the Germans to abandon Salaita Hill 
with hardly a shot fired. During the afternoon of 11 March, the British launched an attack, 
which took them to the foot of the Latema-Reata hills where were enemy gunfire held 
them up. Malleson, the commander at Salaita, apparently suffering from dysentery and 
perhaps a dose of uncomfortable déjà vu, chose to report sick.99 Tighe took over the 
command from Malleson. In the aftermath of the battle, these two generals were relieved 
of their command by Smuts who could barely conceal his contempt of their 
performance.100 
 
Conclusion 
 
South Africa, perhaps more so than the other belligerents, possessed an acute sensitivity 
to the political situation on the home front. Therefore, the divisive politics within her 
borders shaped her war policy and strategy. One could go as far as to say that South 
Africa’s politics moulded her strategy, operational art, and even her tactics. Politics 
affected the conduct of the war in some key areas. Furthermore, the anti-British 
sentiments of the Afrikaner nationalists at home made her particularly sensitive to 
excessive casualties. 
 
The plan of attack on Salaita Hill was the product of an age-old British doctrine, 
inculcated in Malleson, which favoured frontal assaults and believed that elan, esprit de 
corps and superior morale could gain the ascendency over an enemy’s defensive 
firepower. The UDF, its doctrinal roots being an amalgamation of Boer, colonial and British 
systems, possessed a distinctly different way of war. The UDF favoured a war of 
manoeuvre and using the mobility of mounted infantry; they preferred to outflank or 
envelope an enemy rather than become involved in a costly frontal assault. The UDF, as 
demonstrated in their highly successful campaign in GSWA in 1915, chose to manoeuvre 
before engaging with the enemy, while the British, tied into their large logistic needs, 
fought in order to manoeuvre. The British preference for a direct frontal assault rather 
                                                          
97.  TNA, WO 141/62 6128, Smuts Despatch on East Africa, 20 June 1916. 
98.  W.K Hancock and J. van der Poel (eds), Selections from the Smuts Papers, Vol III, July 1910 -
November 1918 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1966), p 337. 
99.  Meinertzhagen, Army Diary, p 170. Meinertzhagen provides a little more illumination on 
the matter, recalling that Smuts had called Malleson a “coward”. This was not a position 
that Meinertzhagen disagreed with. 
100.  TNA, WO 32/5822, J.C. Smuts, “Operations in East Africa” (Memorandum Smuts to CIGS, 23 
March 1916) p 73a. Smuts was anxious that Tighe’s reassignment to the Indian Army was 
not considered in the same light as Malleson.  
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than a South African predilection for an operational enveloping movement, led to a clash 
of doctrine, which cost the South Africans dearly at Salaita.  
 
REFERENCES 
 
Anderson, R., ‘JC Smuts and JL van Deventer: South African Commanders-in-Chief of a 
British Expeditionary Force’, Scientia Miltaria, 31,2(2003). 
Army Council, Field Service Regulations: Operations (His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 
Edinburgh, 1909). 
Baily, J., The First World War and the Birth of the Modern Style of Warfare (Strategic and 
Combat Studies Institute, Camberley, 1996). 
Beca, Colonel, A Study of the Development of Infantry Tactics (George Allen & Unwin, 
London, 1915). 
Boell, L., Die Operationen in Ost-Afrika (Walther Dachert, Hamburg, 1951). 
Callwell, C.E., Small War: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers (Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office, London, 1896). 
Capell, A. E., The Second Rhodesia Regiment in East Africa (The Naval & Military Press, 
Uckfield, 2006). 
Citino, R.M., Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (University Press of 
Kansas, Kansas City, 2007). 
Citino, R.M., The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920–39, 
(Stackpole, Mechanicsburg, 1999). 
Collyer, J.J., The South Africans with General Smuts in German East Africa (Government 
Printer, Pretoria, 1939). 
Combined Training (War Office, London, 1905). 
Crowe, J.H.V., General Smuts' Campaign in East Africa (John Murray, London, 1918). 
Fendall, C.P., The East African Force 1915–1919: The First World War in Colonial Africa 
(Leonaur Publishing, Driffield, 2014). 
Fuller, J.F.C., The Foundations of the Science of War (US Army Command & General Staff 
College Press, Kansas City, 1993). 
Garcia A., “Manoeuvre Warfare in the South African Campaign in German South West 
Africa during the First World War”, MA dissertation, University of South Africa, 
2015). 
Halder, F., Analysis of U.S. Field Service Regulations, MS No. P-133 (Historical Division, 
United States Army, Europe, 1953). 
Hancock, W.K. and Van der Poel, J. (eds), Selections from the Smuts Papers, Vol III, July 1910–
November 1918 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1966). 
Hordern, C., Military Operations East Africa, Volume 1, August 1914–September 1916 (His 
Britannic Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1941). 
Hyam, R. and Henshaw, P., The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa since the 
Boer War (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003). 
Hyam, R., The Failure of South African Expansion, 1908–1948 (Macmillan, London, 1972). 
Katz – A clash of military doctrine 
 
47 
 
Hyam, R., Understanding the British Empire (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2010). 
Infantry Training (Provisional) (War Office, London, 1902). 
Jones, S., “The Influence of the Boer War (1899–1902) on the Tactical Development of the 
Regular British Army, 1902–1914”, PhD thesis, University of Wolverhampton, 2009. 
Katzenellenbogen, S., South Africa and Southern Mozambique: Labour, Railways, and Trade 
in the Making of a Relationship (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1982). 
Meinertzhagen, R., Army Diary, 1899–1926 (Oliver & Boyd, London, 1960). 
Paice, E., Tip and Run (Phoenix, London, 2008). 
Pakenham, T., The Boer War (Futura, London, 1982).   
Sampson, P.J., “The Conquest of German East”, in The Nongquai Special Commemoration 
Issue (Argus, Pretoria, 1917). 
Shy, J., “First Battles in Retrospect”, in Heller, C.E., and Stofft, W.A. (eds), America’s First 
Battles, 1776–1965 (University Press of Kansas, Kansas City, 1986). 
Stapleton, T.J., A Military History of South Africa from the Dutch-Khoi Wars to the End of 
Apartheid (Praeger, Santa Barbara, 2010). 
Thompson, E.S., “A Machine Gunner’s Odyssey through German East Africa: The Diary of 
ES Thompson, Part I, 17 January to 24 May 1916”, South African Military History 
Journal, 7,4(1987). 
Uys, I., South African Military Who's Who, 1452–1992 (Fortress, Germiston, 1992). 
Van der Waag, I., A Military History of Modern South Africa (Jonathan Ball, Cape Town, 
2015). 
Van der Waag, I., “Boer Generalship and the Politics of Command”, War in History, 12,1 
(2005).  
Van der Waag, I., “Smuts’s Generals: Towards a First Portrait of the South African High 
Command, 1912-1948”, War in History, 18,1(2011). 
Van der Waag, I., “South African Defence in the Age of Total War, 1900–1940”, Historia, 60, 
1(2015). 
Von Lettow-Vorbeck, P.E., My Reminiscences of East Africa (Hurst & Blackett, London, 
1920). 
Watt, J., “The Eye of Revelation” available at <http://jr-books.com/EoR-Article-101115-
MallesonPhoto.html> (Accessed 16 June 2016). 
